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The Aftermath of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Basil Borisov 
 
After the Exxon Valdez ran aground in the Prince William Sound and discharged millions of 
gallons of crude oil, the real “disaster” began to unfold – marine life began to die, fisheries 
collapsed, fishermen lost their livelihoods, families fell apart.  But perhaps the disaster began 
even earlier, when the oil was piped from the North Slope to Valdez.  Perhaps even earlier than 
that, when the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System became operational.  It is clear that something went 
wrong along the way; otherwise, how could a single man's inebriation result in a massive 
environmental disaster with such far-reaching consequences?  More importantly, since it is 
virtually impossible to foresee every single failure in the complex system of upstream and 
downstream activities, what can we do to prevent disasters and to minimize their impacts? 
I.  The Farber, Plater and  Freudenburg (FPF) Framework for Examining Disasters 
According to Farber, disasters require a "circle of risk management."  On a fundamental level, 
the notion of a circular approach to disasters makes sense - at least theoretically, humans will 
learn from past events and apply that knowledge to minimize losses if a similar event repeats.  
Farber's circle comprises four main events: mitigation, emergency response, compensation and 
rebuilding.  In essence, before a potential loss-causing event humans prepare for the event using 
foresight and knowledge gained from prior experiences; immediately after the event humans 
respond with short-term measures designed to contain the effects of the event and to save lives; 
after the immediate response, a longer period of restoration (both people and property) includes 
compensating the victims of the event and rebuilding the effected area in a way that ties directly 
into mitigation. 
Zygmund Plater, in his New York Times Online Forum piece on the BP Deepwater incident, 
divides human intercourse with disaster into four “strategic sectors” that are almost identical 
(indeed, identical in practice) to Farber's circle of risk management.  While Plater does not 
expressly arrange his “strategic sectors” in a circle, it is only natural to suppose that the 
knowledge gained from human experience with a disaster will be incorporated in the 
“prevention” sector. 
It is precisely this “prevention” sector that is the focus of Freudenburg's Catastrophe in the 
Making.  But Freudenburg expands this concept to encompass not just prevention mechanisms 
designed for a particular type of disaster, but also the conscious, socially acceptable choices we 
make in arranging our surroundings that make us more vulnerable.  Freudenburg suggests what 
is intuitively correct, that had the story of human settlement and development of the New 
Orleans region been different, hurricane Katrina may not have been a disaster at all, but simply 
another weather phenomenon playing out the natural course of its brief life.  Freudenburg points 
out that humans think of disasters as uncommon, unexpected, unplanned and uncontrollable, 
while ignoring the fact that human actions regarded as ordinary “set the table and ring the dinner 
bell” for this uncommon dinner guest. 
The combined framework of Farber, Plater and  Freudenburg (FPF) for examining human 
intercourse with a disaster includes not only the human activities immediately before, during and 
after a particular disaster, but also the social choices that undergird the preparation and 
rebuilding.  The FPF framework can therefore be summarized as follows: 
1. Social Values, 
2. Preparation, 
3. Emergency Response, 
4. Restoration, and 
5. Compensation and Accountability 
In the following sections, we use the FPF framework in discussing the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
(EVOS) and the places where we can look for answers. 
II.  Social Choices – Do We Dig Our Own Grave? 
Arguably, the most unfortunate consequences of the EVOS were damage to the rich ecosystems 
of the Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska.  Additionally, detrimental effects on local 
fisheries resulted in economic losses to local fishing communities, and allegedly inadequate 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and improper response techniques resulted in long-term 
adverse health effects in spill responders.  While Riki Ott's Sound Truth and Corporate Myth$ 
overwhelmingly focused on Exxon's unseemly behavior in the aftermath of the spill, Ott had also 
pointed to some of the larger social factors that arguably precipitated the incident, or at least 
resulted in Exxon not shouldering the proper share of the burden. 
Individually, we may value things differently than as a society.  Observers like Ott point out that 
the focus of the United States collective has increasingly been development and economic 
growth.  This focus has likely shifted attention and resources from items that are ancillary to 
activities that promote development and growth.  For example, when a government project has 
strong support across all levels of stakeholders, the project's Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) is likely to receive less scrutiny in the  review process.  Similarly, if the extraction of oil 
from Alaska's North Slope, its transport to the port at Valdez (that is, the construction of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System [TAPS]), and subsequent transport to refineries in California was 
a popular  proposal, strict scrutiny of the project's environmental impacts may not have been a 
priority for those granting project permits or those ultimately responsible for the project's 
operation.  No doubt environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) participated in the EIS review, but there is a limit to what 
these organizations can do to force the project sponsors to reevaluate the value judgments 
underlying the benefit-cost analysis of project alternatives. 
The importance of developing oil fields in Alaska's North Slope is not doubted; this development 
generated tremendous revenues for the State of Alaska, increased returns to shareholders in the 
participating oil companies, played an important role in our national energy security and lessened 
our dependence on oil from the Middle East.  But these “benefits” were truly benefits largely 
because the United  States consumes astronomical quantities of oil products, and has grown 
dependent on oil for economic activity (transportation, petrochemicals, plastics, etc.)  It is very 
likely that a wholesale shift of social priorities, and of the paradigm of how to achieve those 
priorities, is necessary to make meaningful improvements in how we develop and consume 
resources. 
III.  Maybe Science Holds the Answers 
Since before the agricultural revolution, humans have been applying their big brains to control 
and exploit the Earth's resources.  Complex natural systems have been replaced by uniformity; 
redundancies have been eliminated.  Such “advances” made it possible for the human population 
to grow on an unprecedented scale.  With increasing population, crowded urban centers emerged, 
and more areas had to be brought under control for human habitation and food production.  In 
many ways, these changes made humans more vulnerable to disasters – think of the earthquakes 
and fires in major cities, disease epidemics along trade routes, and theories explaining the Classic 
Maya Collapse. 
Over the past century, humans have increasingly put their faith in science to solve problems 
facing an ever increasing population.  Riskier endeavors required increasingly advanced 
technologies to prevent failure and to respond to accidents.  For example, the earliest modern oil 
wells were drilled vertically to relatively shallow depths.  The need to develop oil reserves 
located deep beneath the oceans and in hostile environments such as Alaska's North Slope 
prompted advances in drilling and oil transport, and attendant advances in technologies designed 
to prevent and respond to oil spills.  Arguably, advances in spill response have not caught up with 
advances in production.  The response to EVOS was composed largely of the following 
elements: use of chemical dispersants, manual skimming with booms and sorbent pads, and 
pressurized hot water washing of beaches.  (Ott).  According to some sources, the EVOS cleanup 
caused more damage than did the spilled oil.  The pressurized hot water wiped away rockweed 
and intertidal species that had survived the effects of the oil, and the dispersants may have caused 
long-term effects in the clean-up workers.  (Ott). 
More than twenty years after EVOS, the response technologies employed in the Gulf of Mexico 
spill are essentially the same as in EVOS.  Reported consequences of dispersant use in the Gulf 
of Mexico include dolphin mortalities from hemorrhaging, dispersant workers passing blood in 
their urine, and residents of coastal communities reporting breathing illnesses and blood effects.  
(40 ELR 11044).  Additionally, the chronic effects of large quantities of dispersants on marine 
life are still not known. 
The manual methods of oil clean-up in the Gulf have also remained largely unchanged.  These 
methods include the use of booms to contain and sorb oil on the water surface, and sorbent pads 
to remove visible oil from surfaces along the shoreline.  Such manual methods usually result in 
very low recoveries of the spilled oil, and a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of these manual 
technologies is likely to reveal greater overall cost than benefit.  The environmental costs include 
the energy (and the attendant consequences of energy generation and use) needed to 
manufacture, transport, deploy and recover the booms/pads, and the landfill space for the 
disposal of spent booms/pads. 
We can drill more than a mile beneath the ocean, but is seems our first aid kit contains little more 
that band-aids.  Advances in science and engineering can potentially provide solutions, but our 
resources are focused on production technologies, not disaster prevention and response 
technologies.  Having the capability to design, produce and implement a new technology is 
worthless without the incentive to do so. 
IV.  Maybe Law Holds the Answers 
In his memoir, former BP Chief Lord Browne discusses BP's foray into Russia during the 
country's transition period in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Contrary to popular belief, Russia had 
perhaps the most comprehensive environmental regulations in the world, but the regulations 
were used as a selective enforcement tool by the government.  Fortunately, the United States 
does not suffer from the same malady – on balance, our environmental laws are uniformly and 
faithfully enforced.  However, many gray areas in the law can be exploited, and close 
relationships between the regulators and the regulated community can lead to lapses in oversight.  
A commission that investigated the EVOS found that oil companies cut corners to increase 
profits.  (Joe Stephens, Washington Post, July 14, 2010)  Regulators and industry were very close 
together, and the regulators approved inadequate plans for oil spill response and cleanup.  
(Stephens).  Alaska governor-appointed commission studied the accident and concluded that the 
disaster was “the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety practices.  (Stephens). 
Taking advantage of gray areas in the law is a practice as old as the first laws.  Something may 
be morally reprehensible, not in the best interest of society, or outright evil, yet still be legally 
defensible.  During the electricity deregulation in California, Enron's former President Ken Lay 
told a California politician something very close to, “I don't care what kind of cooky laws you 
Californians put in place, I've got a bunch of really smart people that are going to figure out how 
to make money anyways.”  (Enron: Smartest Guys In The Room).  The ensuing market 
manipulation by Enron's traders resulted in massive rolling blackouts across California, cost the 
State an estimated $40-45 billion and ultimately caused the State's financial crisis. 
When evaluating Exxon's actions with the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to play the “should 
have” game.  Exxon should have done this, or should have not done that, regardless of what the 
regulations specifically required.  For example, Exxon was not required to transport oil in 
double-hulled tankers; that regulation came into effect only after EVOS (and as a response to 
EVOS).  But should the company have instituted such a measure in the face of legitimate risks 
that a tanker capable of holding more that 50 million gallons of oil may discharge all or most of 
its cargo if its single hull is damaged in a collision? 
Unfortunately (or fortunately), it is impossible for the legislature to envision all potential 
disasters and provide for them accordingly.  The answer to those problems is likely buried 
deeper, as Freudenburg suggests, in the social fabric and in the importance we place on 
“progress” and “economic development.” 
But the legal system can provide workable rules for accountability and compensation, largely 
grown out of tort law.  In the aftermath of EVOS, Exxon spent over $2 billion on spill clean-up, 
compensation to effected coastal residents, natural resource damage payments, scientific studies 
for the public trust, and other penalties.  Exxon's position is that it has fully paid for the injuries it 
caused; others, especially the compensated victims, feel that Exxon got off cheap.  But the same 
debate is very likely to unfold in every instance where disaster victims receive compensation.  In 
a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Ken Feinberg, the claims distributor for the Gulf 
of Mexico spill, discussed the challenges he is facing in settling claims.  According to Feinberg, 
everyone has his hand out, and he must weed out the legitimate claims.  Additionally, and 
predictably, most victims feel they were not paid enough.  But overall, it appears the Gulf of 
Mexico claims settlement process is working, efficiently distributing moneys from BP's trust 
fund, and keeping thousands of cases out of the courts.  This seems like a better alternative to 
litigation, which in the case of EVOS lasted twenty years. 
V.  Conclusion 
So what have we learned from EVOS that has changed the way we prevent and respond to 
disasters?  Perhaps we are, after all, stuck in a habitual pattern of thinking about disasters as 
something out of the ordinary and not something that naturally occurs as a result of the broader 
choices we make.  Driven by basic urges to populate and dominate, we have defined as “good” 
everything that promotes the subjugation and exploitation of the Earth's resources for the benefit 
of man; and as “bad” those ideas that stall progress.  Necessarily, we create mega-systems to 
implement such exploitation on a massive scale.  And we persecute those who would tell us that 
what we are doing is wrong.  As long as this mindset defines us as a society, we stand very little 
chance of preventing another EVOS. 
 
